Eur. Phys. J. A (2020) 56: 90
https://doi.org/10.1140/epja/s10050-020-00089-w

Regular Article - Theoretical Physics

Philosophical foundations of effective field theories

¹ Department of Philosophy, Columbia University, New York, USA
² CEA-Saclay, IRFU/Larsim, 91191, Gif-sur-Yvette Cedex, France

^* e-mail: sr3109@columbia.edu

Received: 30 May 2019
Accepted: 30 July 2019
Published online: 19 March 2020

Abstract

This survey covers some of the main philosophical debates raised by the framework of effective field theories during the last decades. It is centered on three issues: whether effective field theories underpin a specific realist picture of the world, whether they support an anti-reductionist picture of physics, and whether they provide reasons to give up the ultimate aspiration of formulating a final and complete physical theory. Reviewing the past and current literature, we argue that effective field theories do not give convincing reasons to adopt a particular stance towards these speculative issues. They hold good prospects for asking ontologically perspicuous and sensible questions about currently accessible domains. With respect to more fundamental questions, however, the only certainty is provisional and instrumental: effective theories are currently indispensable for conducting fruitful scientific research.